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INTRODUCTION 
In the present paper we explore the causes of female legislative turnover in eight west European 
legislative chambers in the period from 1945 to 2015. Female turnover refers to the number of 
new female legislators, expressed as a proportion of the total number of members of parliament 
(MPs) who enter the legislature after general elections. The topic is socially significant and 
scientifically topical from the perspective of both political elite circulation research and gender 
and politics studies. To begin with, legislative turnover of both male and female MPs (total 
turnover) is a ‘kind of seismographer’ that detects shifts in the composition of political elites and 
consequently in the foundations of politics and polity (Putnam 1976). It is also a ‘democratic 
thermometer’ measuring the quality and competitiveness of democracy to the extent that 
democracy is perceived as the organization of the alternation in power (Crowther and Manytone 
2007). Past research reveals that the causes of total legislative turnover have been extensively 
studied, especially in the US context and increasingly so in the European one too (Manow 2007, 
Heinsohn and Freitag 2012, Heinsohn 2014, Gouglas, Maddens, Brans 2016). However, the 
gender dimension of the phenomenon and female turnover in particular is largely under-
researched. From a purely political elites circulation perspective an interesting question is the 
following. Do explanations of the political alternation of women MPs in legislatures differ than 
those of men? And what can we learn about the determinants of legislative turnover through the 
study of its gender dimension?   
Beyond its importance for the study of the circulation of political elites, female turnover is also 
important from a purely gender perspective. The number of new women MPs entering 
parliament after general elections is the thermostat of female representation. Female 
representation refers to the total number of women MPs as a proportion of the total number of 
MPs in the legislature. It is the sum of re-elected women incumbents and women newcomers. 
Evidently, the number of women newcomers after general elections sets the upper limit to the 
total number of women MPs in parliament, thus delimiting the ceiling of female descriptive 
representation. A very low inflow of new women lawmakers keeps the overall number of women 
MPs low. In order to reach the target of gender balanced assemblies and given the historical 
starting point of male only legislatures there needs to be a continuous inflow of new women 
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MPs. In view of the above, the gender related research question driving the present study is what 
explains variability in the influx of new women MPs in parliament across country, across time?  
In order to answer the above stated questions we bring together a unique longitudinal dataset on 
total legislative turnover and gender turnover in Europe. The dataset combines original 
information on turnover in eight European unicameral or lower chambers in the period from 
1945 to 2015. Our analytical framework combines legislative turnover theory with the insights of 
female representation research. In terms of variables, it comprises original information on MP 
remuneration with existing data on strength of bicameralism, regional authority, duration of 
legislative term, party ideology, diffusion of gender quotas, electoral volatility, district 
magnitude and strength of personal vote.  
The paper will proceed as follows. First, we discuss the concept of legislative turnover and 
highlight the challenge of gender. Second, we present a framework explaining female legislative 
turnover and how this relates to explanations of total and male legislative turnover. Third we 
present our research design. Fourth, we provide a comparative descriptive analysis of turnover 
trends in time. Fifth, we extent our analysis using quantitative methods. We conclude with a 
discussion of our findings and suggest paths for future research. In this final part we confirm 
some findings from earlier work on turnover and highlight some novel insights on the differences 
between explanations of female and male turnover, which to our knowledge was not shown in a 
comparative setting before.  
LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER AND THE CHALLENGE OF GENDER 
Legislative turnover refers to the percentage of membership change in parliament after general 
elections. Although total turnover has been extensively studied (Hyneman 1938; Oden 1965; Ray 
1974; Rosenthal 1974; Collie 1981; Somit et al. 1994; Moncrief 1998; Swain et al. 2000; 
Matland and Studlar 2004; Moncrief et al. 2004; Crowther and Matonyte 2007; Manow 2007; 
Heinsohn and Freitag 2012; Kuklys 2013; Heinsohn 2014; Verzichelli 2014; Francois and 
Grossman 2015; Gouglas, Maddens, Brans 2016; Gouglas and Maddens 2017) its gender 
dimension remains largely under-researched. When it comes to women legislators, the bulk of 
research focuses primarily on the levels of female representation in parliaments (Andersen and 
Thorson 1984, Darcy and Choike 1986, Darcy 1988, Matland 1993, 1998; Matland and Studlar 
1996; Caul 1999; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; 
Meier 2004; Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008; Tripp and Kang 2008; Rosen 2012; Thames 2016; 
Pruysers and Blais 2016).  
In the present study we aim to cover this empirical gap. We aim to investigate the causes of 
female turnover and whether they are different than those of male turnover. A first question is 
how do we approach turnover? The literature reveals that approaches and measures of turnover 
differ. Some researchers focus on the fates of incumbents. For them the interesting questions 
revolve around membership stability and the challenges caused by the ‘victorious incumbent’ 
(Somit et al 1994). They measure turnover by counting incumbents exiting parliament, or by 
incumbents succeeding to return. Others approach the topic through the eyes of non-incumbents. 
For them the interesting questions revolve around change and renewal of the elite. They count 
newcomers entering parliament.  
We define female legislative turnover as the number of new female legislators, expressed as a 
proportion of the total number of members of parliament (MPs) who enter the legislature after 
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general elections. Our interest lies with women newcomers, not the fate of women incumbents. 
We adopt the same approach for total and male turnover. We take this approach because the 
number of extra women legislators entering parliament after elections sets the upper limit to the 
total number of women in parliaments. It is the thermostat of female representation. If new 
women MPs, extra to the number of female incumbents, don’t enter legislative politics then the 
total number of women in parliament will never reach that of men. In this respect it is important 
to know what determines fluctuations in the rate of women newcomers in parliament.  
We will answer the above stated questions drawing on two bodies of literature: legislative 
turnover and female representation. Our theoretical starting point is that female membership 
change is part of the broader phenomenon of membership change in parliaments. Much like 
legislative turnover in general, female turnover too can be seen as the end result of a 
‘representative elite production process’ (Best and Cotta 2000). Adopting the Best and  Cotta 
(2000) framework, Gouglas et al (2016) conceptualized this process as involving four main 
elements: the structure of political career opportunities, which shapes the supply of aspirants; 
party selectorates, which shape the demand for candidates; electorates, which shape the demand 
for MPs; and the electoral system, which structures the choices of all of the above mentioned 
actors, as well as mechanically translates votes into seats.    
In a world where there are no gender differences we would expect the relative importance of 
those factors (and the associated causes) to be the same for female, male and total turnover. We 
have reasons to believe that this is not the case. To begin with, explanations of the variability of 
total turnover across time is suspect of a male turnover bias. They explain turnover in legislatures 
that for their most part in the 20th century have been dominated by men (and most still are), their 
gender composition only changing very gradually. As a result they tend to mirror the 
phenomenon of male turnover, while blurring the distinct dynamics of female representative elite 
circulation.  
Added to the above, the literature on female representation awakens us to certain important 
gender relevant realities / biases. There are four such gender biases of relevance. According to 
some studies, men exhibit more political career ambition than women (Carroll 1985; Fox and 
Lawless 2005; Lawless and Fox 2005; Pruysers 2016), but women seek more policy influence 
(Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Consantini 1990; Lawless and Theriault 2005). Other studies 
highlight that political parties perpetuate a male bias when it comes to candidate selection 
(Duverger 1955, Niven 1998), however, fast track equality policies like gender quotas have 
institutionalized a female advantage in the form of measures of affirmative action (Dahlerup 
2006, Tripp and Kang 2008). Moreover, some studies claim that voters can be biased toward 
women candidates (Foucault 2006; Frechette, Maniquet, Morelli 2008; Pearson and McGee 
2013). Last, but not least, women’s participation in politics is particularly sensitive to the effects 
of electoral institutions (Darcy and Choike 1986; Darcy 1988; Matland 1993, 1996; Matland and 
Studlar 1998, Thames and Williams 2010, Thames 2016). Whether electoral systems work to the 
advantage or the disadvantage of women will depend on the extent to which electoral systems 
encourage women to stand for office, as well as the extent to which they entrench or prevent 
party and voter biases. If the above biases stand, we would expect the causes of female turnover 
to differ in comparison to those of male and total turnover. It is for this reason important to 
discern turnover according to gender and investigate whether the causes of female turnover are 
different to those of male and total turnover and in which respect.      
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Figure 1: Female legislative turnover process 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AND HYPOTHESES 
The present study has three dependent variables: total legislative turnover, male and female 
turnover. The main dependent variable is female legislative turnover defined as the number of 
new female MPs as a proportion of total parliament membership after general elections. Women 
newcomers include both first-entry MPs and returning old timers who were not elected in the 
previous general election. In this respect we measure what Francois and Grossman (2015) would 
call the rate of female ‘political alternation’. Total legislative turnover is measured as the 
proportion of all newcomer MPs (first-entry and returning) irrespective of gender, who enter 
parliament after general elections. Male legislative turnover is measured as the proportion of new 
men MPs (first-entry and returning) who enter the legislature after general elections.  
In seeking to explain cross-national variations we will use the analytical framework outlined in 
the previous section, which identifies four components of the representative elite production 
process. Thus we organise the independent variables into four theoretically relevant blocks (table 
1): the structure of political career opportunities; political parties; voters; electoral systems. 
Every component - block is associated with a broader gender turnover related hypothesis. Table 
1 summarises the dependent variables and their operationalisation, as well as the independent 
variables and their predicted effects.  
 
 
Contenders & the 
structure for political 
career opportunity 
Political & policy 
ambition 
Political Parties 
Party bias 
 Electorates 
Voter bias 
 
Electoral systems 
Ambition, party & voter 
bias  
Female 
legislative 
turnover  
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Table 1: Variables and hypotheses 
Dependent 
variables 
Control dependent 
variables 
Main dependent 
variable 
Gender 
differences 
 Operationalisation 
 Legislative turnover 
Male turnover 
Female turnover  [No. of first-entry MPs plus 
returning (total, or male, or 
female) / No. of 
parliamentary seats) * 100 
Blocks of 
IVs 
Control hypothesis Main hypothesis   
Block 1: 
structure of 
opportunity  
Career politicians Limited ambition 
Policy influence 
  
     
MP 
remuneration  
As MP/GNI ratio increases, 
total and male turnover 
increases 
As MP/GNI ration 
increases female 
turnover decreases  
Yes 
direction 
Ratio of annual MP 
remuneration to gross 
national income per head  
Duration of 
legislative 
term 
Lengthy terms increase total 
and male turnover 
Lengthy terms have no 
effect on female turnover 
Yes 
direction 
Number of days between 
elections 
Strength of 
bicameralism  
Strong bicameralism 
increases turnover  
Strong bicameralism 
increases female 
turnover  
No, but 
different 
causal path 
Dummy variable: 0 = weak 
or no bicameralism, 1 = 
strong bicameralism 
Regional 
authority 
The higher the regional 
authority, the higher the 
total and male turnover 
The higher the regional 
authority, the higher the 
female turnover 
No, but 
different 
causal path 
Regional Authority Index  
     
Block 2: 
political 
parties 
Party bias (male 
conspiracy) 
Party bias (female 
advantage) 
  
Party 
ideology 
As % of leftist parties in 
parliament increases total 
turnover increases, but male 
turnover decreases.  
As % of leftist parties in 
parliament increases 
female turnover 
increases 
Yes  
direction 
% of seats held by leftist 
parties 
 
Gender 
quotas 
 
Diffusion of GQs increases 
total turnover and decreases 
male turnover 
 
Diffusion of GQs 
increases female 
turnover 
 
Yes 
direction 
 
% of seats held by parties 
with GQ rules 
     
Block 3: 
electorates 
Volatile electorates Hostile electorates   
Electoral 
volatility (V) 
As V increases, total and 
male turnover increases 
As V increases female 
turnover increases but 
less than male turnover 
Yes size of 
effect 
Pedersen Index  
     
Block 4: 
electoral 
systems 
Incumbency 
(dis)advantage  
Party strategies & 
voter bias 
  
District 
magnitude 
As district magnitude 
increases, total turnover 
increases, but have no effect 
on total turnover  
As district magnitude 
increases, female 
turnover increases 
Yes 
direction 
Average district magnitude 
size in the first tier  
Strength of 
personal vote 
Strong personal vote 
systems decrease male 
turnover, but have no effect 
on total turnover 
Strong personal vote 
systems decrease female 
turnover 
Yes 
direction 
Dummy variable: 0=weak 
personal vote, 1=strong 
personal vote 
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Component 1: The structure for political career opportunities and individual 
ambition 
Turnover starts with the decision of aspirants to stand for election, as well as that of incumbents 
to be mobile, either by taking an alternative political career route, or even by exiting politics. 
Such decisions are linked to individual motivation, which is ‘shaped, ordered and structured by 
its institutional context’ (Norris 1997, p. 13). The institutional context of political careers has 
been termed the ‘structure of opportunities’ (Schlesinger 1966). Different institutional contexts 
of political careers create different flows of lawmakers moving vertically and/or horizontally in 
the political market (Gouglas et al. 2016). When it comes to gender, there is a long history of 
empirical research demonstrating that women exhibit less political career ambition and thus 
political motivation than men (Carroll 1985; Fox and Lawless 2005; Lawless and Fox 2005; 
Pruysers 2016). Moreover, it has also been shown that women value policy influence more than 
status. When their ability to contribute to policy making stalls they are less inclined to stay in 
power (Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Consantini 1990; Lawless and Theriault 2005). If this is true 
we would expect that different structures of opportunity would have different effects on female 
than on male MP renewal. The literature reveals that there are numerous components of the 
institutional context of political careers. We discerned four core components of the institutional 
context of political careers: material rewards for office, duration of the legislative term, internal 
structure of the legislature and state structure (Norris 1997, p. 11, Borchert 2003, p. 12). 
Consequently, we formulated four relevant hypotheses.  
H1: Higher MP wages increase total and male turnover, but decrease female legislative turnover 
Material rewards for office influence political career decisions and consequently turnover 
(Hyneman 1938, Ray 1974, Rosenthal 1974, Squire 1988, Norris 1997, Borchert 2003). Gouglas 
et al. (2016) have recently shown that when wages in the political sector increase, political 
competition increases, leading to an increase in total turnover as more non-incumbents storm into 
legislative politics (entry-effect). According to the political career ambition hypothesis, we 
would expect men to be more sensitive to wage increases in the political sector than women. The 
supply of male non-incumbent candidates would be expected to increase, but women non-
incumbents would not storm into politics simply on the basis of higher wages in the political 
sector. Moreover, male incumbents would want to retain their position on the basis of increasing 
financial rewards, much more than women incumbents who would rather see their policy 
influence increase. This in turn means that higher wages in the political sector increase 
competition and exercise undue pressure to women candidates from both male incumbents and 
non-incumbents. In view of this, we would expect that higher MP wages would decrease the 
number of women new MPs as a proportion of total house membership (retention effect), while it 
would increase that of men (entry-effect). We test this hypothesis by using the MP wages to GNI 
remuneration ratio found in the ParlTurn dataset (Gouglas et al. 2017).     
H2: lengthier legislative terms increase total and male legislative turnover, but have no effect on 
female legislative turnover 
The literature reveals that lengthy legislative terms increase legislative turnover (Matland and 
Studlar 2004; Manow 2007; Heinshon 2014; Francois and Gossman 2015; Gouglas et al. 2016). 
The likelihood that an MP will look for new challenges and switch careers, it is argued, increases 
with the duration of the legislative term. We would expect this not to be the case for women 
legislators. Work and the policy challenges associated with a longer term would have a greater 
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appeal when it comes to the retention of female legislators who would want to retain their seats 
against competition from both men and women candidates. Thus we expect lengthier terms to 
have no effect on female turnover. We measure the duration of a legislative term as the number 
of days between two general elections.  
H3: strong bicameral chambers increase total, male and female legislative turnover 
The number and strength of legislative chambers determine both the chances of someone 
becoming a legislator as well as the options of moving upward within parliament (Borchert 2003, 
p. 12). Strong bicameralism increases the odds that incumbent MPs will want to transition from 
the lower to the upper chamber. This movement to from the lower to the upper chamber  
constitutes a move up the political career ladder. This is an option most valued by men. 
However, when the chambers are at parity it also expands the arenas for policy influence 
opportunities. This is an option most valued by women. Although differently motivated, this 
upward motion leaves vacated seats behind. Men and women non-incumbents would be expected 
to hop into these vacated seats1. Thus, all types of turnover would be expected to increase. We 
measure the strength of bicameralism as 0,1 dummy variable using historical data from the 
Comparative Political Science dataset (Armigeon et al. 2016). Unicameral and weak bicameral 
parliaments are coded 0, while strong bicameral parliaments with chambers at parity level are 
coded 1. 
H4: regional authority increases aggregate, male and female legislative turnover 
The way a state is structured defines the offered political career paths (Norris 1997, Borchert 
2003, p. 12). The issue is not simply one of federal versus unitary states. Rather than territorial 
organization the key here is the actual status and authority of the subnational levels. As regions 
gain authority and status, and regional legislative assemblies become more powerful, there arise 
opportunities for political career advancement and policy influence expansion without clear 
upper and lower career paths (Fiers 2001; Borchert 2011). In such multilevel systems we would 
expect both men and women politicians to ‘level hop’ across levels (Fiers 2001, Borchert 2011, 
Pilet, Tronconi, Onate, Verzichelli 2014). Moving down to the regional level would not be a 
demotion for men incumbents, while women incumbents would value the expansion of policy 
influence at the regional level. The vacated seats would be filled in by both women and men 
newcomers.2 Thus all types of turnover in the legislature would be expected to increase. We 
measure regional authority with the regional authority index (RAI) developed by Hooghe, 
Marks, Schakel, Chapman, Niedzwiecki and Shair-Rosenfield (Hooghe et al 2016).    
Component 2: Political party selectorates and party bias 
Once they have decided to stand for election aspirants have to be selected as candidates by their 
party in order to realize their ambition. Selection, though, can be biased on the basis of gender. 
Party bias can go either way: a) attitudes resembling what Duverger (1955) termed a ‘male 
conspiracy’ against women, or b) equality policies favouring women. Explaining male party 
bias, Niven (1998) argued that within political parties, women are thought to constitute an 
                                                          
1 Moreover, since the two chambers are at parity, there is also the theoretical possibility of upper chamber 
legislators moving to the lower chamber. Our data corroborates that this happens, although more rarely. 
2 Moreover, we would expect some of the legislators who have hoped to the regional level to return back 
to the national one if an opportunity arises, or party strategy demands it. 
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‘outgroup’ in comparison to the ‘ingroup’ of male political elites. Therefore, they are often 
judged as less politically capable candidates and they are either not selected to stand for office, 
or placed in non-realistic list positions and less favourable single member districts. Political party 
ideology has traditionally played an important role in remedying such outgroup effects by 
promoting gender equality policies. Since the 1980s and the 1990s, the role ‘to recruit, nominate 
or select more women for political positions’ has been assumed by gender quotas (Dahlerup 
2006, p. 6). Viewed under this light party bias associated with ‘male conspiracy’ appears to be 
counterbalanced by equality policies that create female advantage. Two hypotheses of relevance.  
H5: An increase in the share of assembly seats controlled by leftist parties increases female 
legislative turnover, decreases male turnover and has no effect on total turnover  
The literature reveals that party ideology has no effect on legislative turnover (Matland and 
Studlar 2004, Gouglas et al. 2016). This, we argue, is a technical not a substantive result. It 
happens because  party ideology effects are neutralized at the aggregate assembly level (Francois 
and Grossman 2015). We expect party ideology to be a strong predictor of both male and female 
turnover, but in different directions. Equality policies have historically been promoted by parties 
on the left and social-liberal parties (Dahlerup 2006, p. 10). Such left and social-liberal parties  
are traditionally more open to gender equality and more likely to select bigger numbers of new 
women candidates to stand for office (Caul, 2001; Norris, 1985; Reynolds, 1999; Rule 1987). In 
view of this, we would expect that as the parliamentary strength of leftist parties increases, 
female legislative turnover would rise too. In the meantime we would expect the influx of new 
male MPs to decrease. We calculate the proportion of seats held by legislators of leftist parties 
using data on party seats and the political parties’ Left-Right continuum in the ParlGov dataset 
developed by Döring, Holger and Manow (2015). Parties that score below 5 in the L-R 10 point 
scale are counted as progressive parties. 
H6: The greater the diffusion of gender quotas across parliamentary parties the higher the total 
and female legislative turnover, but the lower the male turnover 
The effects of gender quotas are extensively studied in the female representation literature 
(Freidnvall 2003; Dahlerup 2006; Tripp et al. 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008), but heavily under-
researched in legislative turnover studies. According to one such study to hand, total legislative 
turnover increases when quotas are implemented by a parliamentary party that holds more than 
15% of the seats in parliament (Gouglas et al. 2016). We expect gender quotas to increase female 
turnover, while decreasing the influx of new male legislators. How? Gender quotas open up the 
‘secret garden’ of political party nominations by forcing selectorates to nominate more women 
candidates (Dahlerup 2006). Given the low levels of female representation quotas bring to the 
electoral landscape increasing numbers of new women candidates. An increase in the total 
number of new women candidates can lead to substantive increases in the proportion of new 
elected women legislators (Darcy and Choike 1986, Darcy 1988). To begin with, competition 
from new male candidates is reduced. Second, intraparty candidate turnover increases to the 
advantage of new women candidates. Third, though more rarely, intraparty incumbency turnover 
may increase to the disadvantage of male incumbents. The literature reveals that quotas have 
significant but smaller effects at the time of their adoption, but their main consequences play out 
over time (Thames 2016, p. 21). Thus we would expect quotas to increase female legislative 
turnover when they are in effect by parliamentary parties at any one time. As they are diffused 
across parliamentary parties the influx of new women candidates and eventually legislators 
9 
 
would be expected to increase, while that of men would be expected to decrease. We measure 
diffusion of quotas as the percentage of seats held by parties who apply a gender quota rule. If 
quotas are legislated at the national level we take into consideration the proportion of seats held 
by the parliamentary party that has actually implemented the quota regulation. In this respect we 
deal with cases, like in France, where parties prefer to be fined rather than implement the 
legislated parity rule.  As is the case with the first hypothesis data on quotas were collected from 
the Global Database on Quota for Women (Quota Database 2016). 
Component 3: Electorates and voter bias 
Once they have been selected to stand for office, candidates compete during general elections. 
The choices voters make at the ballot box represent one of the most common sources of political 
alternation in parliaments. Such choices represent preferences for parties and/or candidates. 
Election, though, much like selection can also be biased on the basis of gender. Voter bias means 
that electorates are more hostile to women candidates, thus creating a male advantage among 
candidates with otherwise similar characteristics. The extent of voter bias against women in 
politics is contested. On one hand the conventional wisdom is that men and women perform 
equally at the ballot (Smith and Fox 2001; Black and Ericson 2003; Anzia and Berry 2011). On 
the other hand, recent studies have cast doubt on such claims (Foucault 2006; Frechette, 
Maniquet, Morelli 2008; Pearson and McGee 2013). If voter bias is present, we would expect it 
to make women candidates (incumbents and non-incumbents) easier to defeat in comparison to 
men candidates (incumbents and non-incumbents). Given the absence of data on voter candidate 
preference volatility we formulated only one electorate relevant hypothesis focusing on party 
preference swings3.  
H7: Electoral volatility increases total, male and female turnover, but its effect on female 
turnover is smaller  
Electoral volatility is one of the strongest predictors of legislative turnover in all studies. 
According to Darcy (1988) changes in voters’ party preferences create opportunities for 
newcomers, including women. Simply put, when voter shares change party hands the 
opportunity arises for both men and women candidates to enter legislative politics. In view of 
this, we would expect that as electoral volatility increases, female legislative turnover would 
increase too. However, according to the voter bias theory some residual portion of the electorate 
remains unreconciled to changes in gender roles. Such biased voters, although they might change 
party preference, they might not opt for a female candidate. Women candidates might be 
disadvantaged in comparison to their men colleagues. This in turn could result into more 
substantial increases in the numbers of new men lawmakers entering parliament than in the 
numbers of new women legislators. We measure volatility using the Pedersen index V.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Evidently, by focusing only on electoral volatility it is hard to discern the extent of voter bias against women. We 
can nevetherless measure the extent to which women non-incumbents benefit from voter party swings in comparison 
to men.   
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Component 4: Electoral systems: between newcomer facilitation and incumbency 
advantage 
Electoral systems are a crucial component of the elite production process. Beyond their 
mechanical effect of translating votes into seats, they structure the choices of all the main actors 
in that process: they can encourage or discourage individual motivation to stand for office; they 
can determine the chances someone has to become a candidate by shaping party selectorate 
strategies; they can determine the chances someone has to become a legislator by delimiting 
voter choice. In this respect, electoral systems potentially incorporate all types of gender related 
biases within them. This in turn means that we would expect electoral systems to have different 
effects on male and female turnover. The literature documents that proportional representation 
list systems elect a greater proportion of newcomers than single member district ones. The same 
holds true for the total number of women in parliament (Duverger 1955; Lakeman, 1976; 
Engstrom, 1987; Rule 1987; Matland 1993, 1998; Matland and Studlar 1996; Kenworthy & 
Malami 1999; Reynolds, 1999, Htun & Jones 2002; Thames 2016). However, proportional 
representation systems can vary substantially in a number of areas (Thames and Williams 2010, 
p. 1579, Verzichelli 2014, Gouglas et al. 2016). As a consequence ‘not all aspects of the 
proportional representation system will work to the advantage of women and not all aspects of 
the single member district system will work to their disadvantage’ (Darcy 1988, p. 64). We thus 
need to focus on specific electoral system dimensions. Based on what we know from past 
empirical studies on turnover and female representation we decided to examine two main aspects 
of the electoral system: district magnitude and strength of personal vote.    
H9: The higher the mean district magnitude in the first tier, the higher the total and female 
turnover, but there is no effect on male turnover 
District magnitude refers to the number of seats per district. The higher the district magnitude the 
higher the legislative turnover. The finding is well documented in the legislative turnover 
literature (Niemi and Winsky 1987; Crain 1977; Reed 1994; Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2004, 
2008; Gouglas et al. 2016). There are three reasons for this. First, incumbents in multimember 
districts appear to exit legislative politics more often because relations with the constituents are 
less satisfactory than in single member districts (Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2004, p. 372) 
while campaigns too are more costly (Winsky 1987). To the extent that dissatisfied incumbents 
exit, the vacated seats would be expected to be filled rather mechanically by men and women 
newcomers. The individual ambition hypothesis tells us nothing about gender differences in 
individual satisfaction due to district magnitude, thus we expect no gender turnover differences 
on the basis of this causal path. Second, election strategies change as district magnitude increases 
(Matland and Brown 1992, Matland 1993, p. 738). More seats per district means that parties 
enjoy more opportunities to balance their tickets with new candidates. As district magnitude 
increases parties do not simply want to win, but to increase their margin of victory. This leads 
them to include new candidates in order to increase their appeal to as many voters as possible. 
These new candidates can be both men (of different ethnic origin, age, or socio-occupational 
background) and women (Matland and Studlar 2004, Thames and Williams 2010, p. 1579, 
Gouglas et al. 2016). However, given that women constitute one out of two voters we would 
expect parties to table more women candidates than men and this practice to be diffused across 
parties (Matland and Studlar 1993). As Gallagher (1988, p. 268) pointed the evidence suggests 
that ticket balancing appears to be much more relevant when it comes to gender than when it 
comes to age or other characteristics of aspirants. The third reason is mechanical. Both men and 
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women non-incumbents can do better in bigger constituencies because there are more marginal 
seats. Non-incumbents can enter the legislature through the marginal seats that open up because 
of electoral shifts. This is known to be particularly the case for women  (Engstrom 1987, Darcy 
1988). Since parties balance their ticket with more women non-incumbents than men, women 
non-incumbents would be expected to win more marginal seats. Thus for all of the above 
reasons, we expect district magnitude to increase total turnover and in particular female turnover. 
However, we expect no effect on male turnover. To test the hypothesis, we collected data on 
average district magnitude before elections in the first tier, using information from the Database 
of Electoral Systems (Pilet, Renwick, Núñez, Simón 2016).  
H10: Strong personal vote systems decrease female turnover, increase male turnover and has no 
effect on total legislative turnover 
Strength of personal vote refers to the propensity of an electoral system to value more personal 
than party reputations (Carey and Shugart 1995). In systems where the value of the personal vote 
is high, incumbents benefit from having developed a reputation for being good constituency 
members, as well as from having resources at their disposal thanks to their elected office. This 
influences turnover via two channels. First, during selections. Incumbents face a lower risk of 
deselection by the nominating bodies4. Second, during elections. In strong personal vote systems, 
where campaigns are also more personalised (André, Freire, Papp 2014), a higher reputation and 
larger resources can tip the balance in favour of the incumbent and against challengers from the 
same or opposing parties. Normally, we would expect both men and women incumbents to 
benefit from high personal vote strength. However, strong personal vote systems are also 
systems where voters are more inclined to vote on the basis of candidates’ personal 
characteristics. In the presence of voter bias, this means that the advantages associated with 
incumbency could be overturned by an electorate that is hostile to women. In view of this, we 
would expect women incumbents in strong personal vote systems to be more vulnerable to voter 
preferences. Moreover, in the presence of voter bias in strong personal vote systems, women 
incumbents risk of losing their seat to men rather than women non-incumbents. Thus, as the 
importance of the personal vote increases, we would expect male turnover to increase and female 
legislative turnover to decrease.  
How do we measure strength of personal vote? Carey and Shugart (1995) argued that the 
propensity of an electoral system to create personal vote incentives can be measured on the 
extent to which parties control nominations (ballot), candidates benefit from the pooling of votes 
across the party and other candidates (pool), voters cast a vote for a party or a candidate5. The 
measures were later refined by Wallack et al. (2003) and Johnson and Wallack (2008) and 
calculated in the form of an index of particularism. As the index has only been calculated since 
                                                          
4 However this dimension should not be overemphasized as incumbents in all systems are very rarely deselected or 
prevented from standing for re-election (Matland and Studlar 2004).  
5 Another dimension of personal vote is its relationship with district magnitude. As Carey and Shugart (1995, p. 418, 
430, 431) argued district magnitude also produces personal vote effects. DM affects personal reputations depending 
on the value of the ballot. In systems where there is no intra-party competition (for instance single member districts) 
as M grows (towards closed list systems) the value of personal reputations shrinks. Conversely, in systems where 
there is intra-party competition as M grows so does the value of personal reputation. ‘The effect of M on the value 
of personal reputation is driven by the imperative (or lack thereof, in closed list systems) of politicians to distinguish 
themselves from their co-partisans in order to be elected’ (Carey and Shugart 1995, p. 431). In view of this we 
created an interaction term between the centered value of the average district magnitude and strength of personal 
vote. The interaction term has no significance when regressed on any of the dependent variables. 
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1978 and not for all countries, we looked for an alternative measure. In their study on legislative 
turnover Matland and Studlar (2004) argued that a distinction between proportional 
representation systems (PR) and majoritarian ones will suffice. We suggest something a little bit 
more refined. Not all list-PR systems are weak in relation to personal vote incentives. When 
considering the likelihood of a perceived personal vote there is a useful distinction to be made 
between open, flexible, closed list multimember systems and non-list single member ones. 
Personal vote is strong in open-list multimember  and non-list single-member district systems. It 
is weak in flexible and closed-list systems multimember district systems.6 Weak personal vote 
systems were coded as 0, strong ones as 1. Information on the electoral system, its ballot 
structure and its changes in time were collected from the Database of Electoral Systems (Pilet, 
Renwick, Núñez, Simón 2016).  
DATA, CASES AND ANALYTICAL METHOD 
Our study focuses on total, female and male gender turnover in eight legislative chambers in 
western Europe for the period 1945-2015. These are the lower or unicameral chambers of 
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. We selected 
our cases on both methodological and pragmatic grounds. Our intention was to cover legislative 
chambers in established European democracies for the whole period since the end of the Second 
World War. This automatically left out countries that experienced spells of undemocratic rule in 
both Europe’s south, center and east. Evidently, even within the remaining west European 
established democracies there was a trade-off between the number of countries we could cover 
and the period we could go back in time. The dataset comprises 152 cases of turnover after 
general elections. However, we only focus on 145 cases for two reasons. First, in Switzerland 
women were given the right to stand for election as late as 1971. Second, the French 1958 
election, the first of the fifth republic, is a theoretical and statistical outlier that exerts undue 
influence on the model.  
To investigate which components and in particular which predictors best predict total, male and 
female turnover we used OLS (hierarchical – blockwise-entry) regression analysis. The selected 
predictors are sequentially entered in blocks (table 1). Every block in the hierarchy represents a 
theoretically important component in explaining turnover and it is also associated with a major 
gender turnover related hypothesis (Table 1). The model was run for all newcomer MPs, then 
separately for women and men to see if the causes explaining their entry to parliament are 
different (Table 1). To begin with, we analyse total legislative turnover. To a certain extent this 
is a replication of the Gouglas et al. (2016) analysis. Certain variable specifications are different 
though. We measure the diffusion of gender quotas across the party system as a continuous and 
not as a 0,1 dummy variable. Last but, not least, the sample is reduced to 145 cases. As a next 
step, we perform another control analysis, this time on male legislative turnover. Following this, 
we analyse our main dependent variable, female legislative turnover, so as to be able to compare 
it with both the total and the male legislative turnover rates.  
                                                          
6 . Our treatment of non-list single member districts is different than that by Carey and Shugart’s (1995), who treat 
them as closed list ones where incentives for personal vote are weak. It is nevertheless consistent with numerous 
studies in the literature, which argue that the personal characteristics of candidates in non-list single member 
districts provide strong incentives for the cultivation of a personal vote (Wallack et al. 2003, Matland and Studlar 
2004, ). 
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COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN AGGREGATE AND GENDER TURNOVER 1945-2015 
In Figure 1, we plot the historical evolution of female legislative turnover and compare it with that 
of male and aggregate legislative turnover.  
Figure 2: Comparative trends in total, female and male legislative turnover 1945-2015 
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A first general observation is that the number of new male legislators follows very closely the 
general aggregate turnover trend. Indeed the Pearson correlation coefficient reveals a highly 
significant (p<0.01) positive association between male and aggregate legislative turnover (0.846). 
This corroborates our initial suspicion that explanations of legislative turnover at the aggregate 
level may be mirroring the male dimension of the representative elite production process. A second 
observation is that female legislative turnover also follows the general trend. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient shows a significant (p<0.01) positive association between female and 
aggregate turnover. Evidently, as new women legislators enter the legislature aggregate turnover 
increases. However, the correlation is much lower (0.497) than in the case of male legislative 
turnover. This is a first indication that although male and female turnover are part of the same 
general phenomenon, they also project crucial differences. This is further corroborated by the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between female and male turnover, which shows a non-significant 
negative association (-0.016) between the two measures.  
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RESULTS 
Total legislative turnover 
We started our analysis with a control regression on total legislative turnover. Table 2 reports the 
results of the hierarchical regression as the four blocks (models) and their associated predictors 
are hierarchically introduced in the analysis.   
Table 2: Determinants of total legislative turnover 1945-2015  
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3,661 4,421   0,828 0,409 
MP remuneration to GNI 
per head 
0,917 0,402 0,166 2,280 0,024 
Duration of electoral term 0,012 0,002 0,378 5,291 0,000 
Strength of bicameralism 3,700 2,003 0,136 1,847 0,067 
Regional Authority Index 0,633 0,131 0,358 4,816 0,000 
2 (Constant) 20,310 6,478   3,135 0,002 
MP remuneration to GNI 
per head 
0,768 0,379 0,139 2,027 0,045 
Duration of electoral term 0,010 0,002 0,330 5,051 0,000 
Strength of bicameralism 7,910 1,989 0,290 3,976 0,000 
Regional Authority Index 0,267 0,135 0,151 1,984 0,049 
Seats by Leftist Parties -0,252 0,093 -0,192 -2,703 0,008 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas 0,156 0,029 0,386 5,458 0,000 
3 (Constant) 5,776 5,307   1,088 0,278 
MP remuneration to GNI 
per head 
0,719 0,297 0,130 2,425 0,017 
Duration of electoral term 0,008 0,002 0,249 4,800 0,000 
Strength of bicameralism 6,596 1,565 0,242 4,215 0,000 
Regional Authority Index 0,431 0,107 0,244 4,033 0,000 
Seats by Leftist Parties -0,100 0,075 -0,076 -1,337 0,183 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas 0,045 0,025 0,111 1,763 0,080 
Electoral Volatility V 0,981 0,105 0,546 9,373 0,000 
4 (Constant) 3,940 5,359   0,735 0,464 
MP remuneration to GNI 
per head 
0,824** 0,289 0,149 2,849 0,005 
Duration of electoral term 0,009*** 0,002 0,276 5,334 0,000 
Strength of bicameralism 7,936*** 1,705 0,291 4,655 0,000 
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Regional Authority Index 0,386*** 0,118 0,218 3,287 0,001 
Seats by Leftist Parties -0,084 0,073 -0,064 -1,152 0,251 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas 0,061* 0,025 0,151 2,451 0,016 
Electoral Volatility V 0,913*** 0,104 0,509 8,785 0,000 
First Tier Mean District 
Magnitude 
0,038** 0,014 0,153 2,782 0,006 
Strength of Personal Vote -1,307 1,595 -0,054 -0,819 0,414 
Dependent Variable: Legislative turnover  
Note: R² = .308 for Model 1, ΔR² = .138 (p<.001) for Model 2, ΔR² = .216 (p<.001) for Model 3, ΔR² = .027 (p<.01) for 
Model 4 
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level, two tailed test. 
 
The analysis corroborates the findings of Gouglas et al. (2016) according to which electorates 
and the structure for political career opportunities are the most important factors in explaining 
aggregate legislative turnover, followed by political parties and electoral systems. A difference to 
the Gouglas et al. (2016) analysis is that the structure of political opportunity appears to add 
more to the explanation of legislative turnover than electorates. A reason for this could be 
differences in the operationalization of certain variables and the reduced sample size. In terms of 
predictors, we observe that higher wages in the political sector increase total turnover by creating 
an entry effect. Length of the legislative term has a significant positive association with total 
turnover. Moreover, strong bicameral chambers increase as do also strong multilevel polities, 
where regional authority is high. Political party ideology does not have an impact on total 
turnover. From the party related variables it is only the diffusion of gender quotas across parties 
that positively influence turnover rates. As expected, electoral volatility increases turnover. 
However, from the two electoral system variables only district magnitude projects a significant 
positive association with total turnover. Strength of personal vote is not significant.   
  Male legislative turnover 
We continued our analysis with a second control regression, this time on male legislative 
turnover. Table 3 reports its results. A first interesting observation is that electoral systems don’t 
matter. What seems to matter most is the structure of political career opportunities and 
electorates, followed somewhat by political party factors. When it comes to specific predictors, 
again, a first observation is that none of our electoral system relevant hypotheses is confirmed. 
Specific electoral system characteristics seem to be irrelevant when it comes to male legislative 
turnover. On the contrary, electoral volatility is significant and has the sole biggest substantive 
impact on male turnover in comparison to other predictors. In addition all the structure for 
political career opportunities related hypotheses are confirmed. The significance and direction of 
the predictors MP wages, length of term, strength of bicameralism and regional authority reflect 
the direction and significance of those variables when regressed on total legislative turnover. 
Finally, political parties also appear to create significant, though much smaller, effects on male 
turnover. Progressive party ideology slightly decreases the influx of new men MPs in the 
legislature, while gender quotas too have a significant, but substantively small, negative 
association with male turnover.   
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Table 3: Determinants male legislative turnover 1945-2015 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,334 3,591  ,650 ,517 
MP remuneration to GNI per head 1,612 ,327 ,347 4,934 ,000 
Duration of electoral term ,010 ,002 ,371 5,363 ,000 
Strength of bicameralism 5,331 1,627 ,233 3,276 ,001 
Regional Authority Index ,326 ,107 ,220 3,059 ,003 
2 (Constant) 19,279 5,589  3,449 ,001 
MP remuneration to GNI per head 1,261 ,327 ,271 3,862 ,000 
Duration of electoral term ,010 ,002 ,376 5,607 ,000 
Strength of bicameralism 7,741 1,716 ,338 4,510 ,000 
Regional Authority Index ,183 ,116 ,123 1,573 ,118 
Seats by Leftist Parties -,310 ,080 -,282 -3,857 ,000 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas ,012 ,025 ,035 ,482 ,630 
3 (Constant) 7,979 4,846  1,646 ,102 
MP remuneration to GNI per head 1,224 ,271 ,263 4,518 ,000 
Duration of electoral term ,008 ,001 ,301 5,340 ,000 
Strength of bicameralism 6,719 1,429 ,293 4,702 ,000 
Regional Authority Index ,310 ,098 ,209 3,178 ,002 
Seats by Leftist Parties -,192 ,068 -,175 -2,812 ,006 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas -,074 ,023 -,220 -3,226 ,002 
Electoral Volatility V ,763 ,096 ,506 7,980 ,000 
4 (Constant) 5,522 5,050  1,093 ,276 
MP remuneration to GNI per head 1,271*** ,273 ,273 4,663 ,000 
Duration of electoral term ,007*** ,002 ,285 4,900 ,000 
Strength of bicameralism 5,775*** 1,607 ,252 3,595 ,000 
Regional Authority Index ,391*** ,111 ,264 3,532 ,001 
Seats by Leftist Parties -,180** ,068 -,163 -2,624 ,010 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas -,073** ,023 -,217 -3,127 ,002 
Electoral Volatility V ,734*** ,098 ,487 7,489 ,000 
First Tier Mean District Magnitude ,016 ,013 ,077 1,244 ,216 
Strength of Personal Vote 2,293 1,503 ,113 1,526 ,129 
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Dependent Variable: Male legislative turnover 
Note: R² = .353 for Model 1, ΔR² = .0063 (p<.001) for Model 2, ΔR² = .185 (p<.001) for Model 3, ΔR² = .008 (p<.244) for Model  
4 
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level, two tailed test. 
 
 Female legislative turnover 
Table 4 summarizes the output of our third and main analysis. The results are revealing. When it 
comes to the entry of new women legislators in parliament it is political parties that matter most. 
The structure for political career opportunities comes second, followed by the electoral system. 
Electorates, though significant, have a very small effect on female turnover. The results are 
equally telling when we look at the effects of specific predictors. Both political party related 
hypotheses were confirmed. An increase in seats held by progressive parties in parliament 
increases the influx of new women lawmakers. Gender quotas have the most substantive effect in 
explaining female turnover in comparison to the other predictors. Moving to the structure of 
opportunity our results are equally interesting. To begin with MP wages appear to decrease 
female turnover. High wages in the politics sector have a negative impact on the influx of new 
women legislators in parliament. This is the opposite to the entry effect observed at the aggregate 
assembly level and in regards to male legislative turnover. Second, the duration of the legislative 
term does not affect female turnover. Duration of term does not impact the entry of new women 
legislators in parliament. Third, the hypothesis that strong bicameral systems increase female 
turnover is confirmed, but the hypothesis that regional authority increases female turnover is not. 
Moving to electorates, the predictor electoral volatility has a significant positive correlation with 
female turnover. The hypothesis is confirmed. It is electoral systems, though, rather than 
electorates that are more important when it comes to female turnover. In terms of specific 
predictors, district magnitude increases female turnover. Its effect is substantive but not as big as 
that of strength of personal vote. Personal vote decreases female turnover by almost 3.5%, 
having the second most substantive effect after gender quotas.   
Table 4: Determinants female legislative turnover 1945-2015 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,416 2,452   0,578 0,564 
MP remuneration to GNI per 
head 
-0,696 0,223 -0,242 -3,118 0,002 
Duration of electoral term 0,002 0,001 0,124 1,626 0,106 
Strength of bicameralism -1,487 1,111 -0,105 -1,338 0,183 
Regional Authority Index 0,305 0,073 0,331 4,183 0,000 
2 (Constant) 1,293 2,852   0,453 0,651 
MP remuneration to GNI per 
head 
-0,500 0,167 -0,174 -2,996 0,003 
Duration of electoral term 0,000 0,001 0,023 0,419 0,676 
Strength of bicameralism 0,326 0,876 0,023 0,372 0,710 
Regional Authority Index 0,083 0,059 0,090 1,401 0,163 
Seats by Leftist Parties 0,055 0,041 0,080 1,333 0,185 
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Diffusion of Gender Quotas 0,143 0,013 0,681 11,378 0,000 
3 (Constant) -1,941 2,840   -0,683 0,496 
MP remuneration to GNI per 
head 
-0,510 0,159 -0,177 -3,213 0,002 
Duration of electoral term 0,000 0,001 -0,011 -0,214 0,831 
Strength of bicameralism 0,034 0,837 0,002 0,040 0,968 
Regional Authority Index 0,119 0,057 0,130 2,090 0,038 
Seats by Leftist Parties 0,088 0,040 0,130 2,211 0,029 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas 0,118 0,014 0,564 8,730 0,000 
Electoral Volatility V 0,218 0,056 0,234 3,897 0,000 
4 (Constant) -1,367 2,523   -0,542 0,589 
MP remuneration to GNI per 
head 
-0,452*** 0,136 -0,157 -3,317 0,001 
Duration of electoral term 0,001 0,001 0,067 1,436 0,153 
Strength of bicameralism 2,303** 0,803 0,162 2,870 0,005 
Regional Authority Index -0,005 0,055 -0,005 -0,089 0,929 
Seats by Leftist Parties 0,093** 0,034 0,136 2,709 0,008 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas 0,134*** 0,012 0,637 11,395 0,000 
Electoral Volatility V 0,179*** 0,049 0,192 3,657 0,000 
First Tier Mean District 
Magnitude 
0,022*** 0,006 0,173 3,477 0,001 
Strength of Personal Vote -3,563*** 0,751 -0,282 -4,746 0,000 
Dependent Variable: Female legislative turnover 
Note: R² = .213 for Model 1, ΔR² = .39 (p<.001) for Model 2, ΔR² = .04 (p<.001) for Model 3, ΔR² = .103 (p<.001) for Model 
4 
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level, two tailed test. 
   
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS - CONCLUSION 
In the present study we tried to explain the causes of female legislative turnover in the 
unicameral or lower chambers of eight European democracies in the period from 1945 to 2015. 
Do explanations of legislative turnover differ by gender? Our theoretical starting point was 
political elite circulation and legislative turnover theories, in particular the idea by Best and 
Cotta (2000) that turnover can be conceptualised as the outcome of a ‘representative elite 
production process’. Following Gouglas et al. (2016) we argued that this outcome is influenced 
by four main factors: the structure for political career opportunities, which shapes the supply of 
contenders; political parties, which shape the demand for candidates; voters, which shape the 
demand for legislators; and electoral systems, which structures the choices by all of the above 
actors and match supply and demand.  
Although female and male turnover are part of a representative elite production process and 
share many similarities, we hypothesized that they must also differ significantly. General 
explanations of legislative turnover are suspect of mirroring explanations of male only turnover. 
The reason for this is that they are associated with legislatures that for their most part in the 20th 
century have been male dominated, their gender synthesis only changing very gradually. In view 
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of this, we suggested a theory of female legislative turnover taking into account a series of 
fundamental hypotheses from the female representation literature. We anchored these hypotheses 
in every element of the representative elite production process. In respect to contender choices 
we hypothesized that female turnover is influenced by the fact that women exhibit less political 
career ambition than men, but value more policy influence than men do. In respect to political 
parties we hypothesized that the influx of new women to parliament is influenced by the degree 
to which party level institutions remedy against ‘male conspiracy’ and ‘outgroup’ effects, while 
male turnover is sensitive to equality policies. In respect to voters we hypothesized that female 
turnover is influenced by levels of voter hostility against female candidates. Finally, in respect to 
the electoral system we hypothesized that it can both advantage and disadvantage women and 
men candidates respectively. We anchored nine predictors within this framework, known from 
the legislative turnover and female representation literatures, and described the causal link of 
each one with total, male and female turnover.  
Using data  that we collected first hand we mapped the historical rates of total, male and female 
turnover across country across time and tested nine predictors using OLS hierarchical-blockwise 
entry regression. The results are revealing. The causes of female differ to those of male and total 
turnover. Total and male turnover are influenced more by electorates and the institutional context 
of political careers. Female turnover is primarily influenced by political parties and electoral 
systems, the structure of political career opportunities, though somewhat differently than men, 
and to a much lesser extent electorates.    
The structure of opportunity: different levels of importance and different logics of 
causality across genders 
The analysis revealed that the institutional context of political careers is the most fundamental 
factor explaining variability in both total and male legislative turnover rates. Higher wages, 
strong bicameral assemblies and multi-level polities with high regional authority increase the 
influx of new legislators in general, and male only newcomers in particular. Lengthy terms 
decrease aggregate and male legislative turnover. On the contrary, the effects of the structure for 
career opportunities on the influx of new women legislators is second in importance, the effects 
of the tested variables somewhat different, while not all of them are important. To begin with, 
the strong negative association between MP wages and female turnover shows that new women 
entries are much more disadvantaged by a) incumbency advantage effects created by high wages 
in the political sector and b) increased political competition by non-incumbent men wanting to 
come into legislative politics due to rising wages. Second, lengthier legislative terms do not seem 
to influence the influx of new women legislators. In the future it would be interesting to know 
whether they are associated with higher incumbent retention rates than those of men. Third, 
strong bicameral chambers increase female turnover, but multi-level polities with high regional 
authority seem to have no effect on the influx of new women legislators. It is difficult to say 
whether women value more policy influence than political career advancement from these 
findings. We could, nevertheless, speculate that women politicians appear to perceive a strong 
upper chamber as an arena of expanded policy influence in comparison to a strong region.   
 Parties and the conditions for female advantage 
The role of political parties is significant, but not the most substantive when it comes to 
explaining total and male legislative turnover rates. On the contrary, the role of political parties 
in remedying ‘outgroup’ effects explains almost 40% of the variance in female legislative 
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turnover. Two main observations in regards to the tested predictors. First, party ideology does 
not appear to influence the total turnover rate. Evidently this happens because gender related 
effects cancel each other out and are neutralized when measured at the assembly level. This 
corroborates the finding by Francois and Grossman (2015) and Gouglas et al. (2016) that the 
aggregate assembly level might not be the ideal level of analysis of political party effects on 
turnover. The decomposition by gender reveals that progressive parties facilitate the entry of new 
women MPs in parliament, while they have the exact opposite effect when it comes to the entry 
of new men MPs. The effect on facilitating the entry of new women in parliament is more 
substantive than that of preventing new male MPs from entering the legislature. Second, the 
diffusion of gender quotas across parties, irrespective of party ideological disposition, increases 
the entry of female MPs in parliament, while it reduces that of men. From all tested predictors, 
the diffusion of gender quotas across parties has by far the biggest substantive impact on female 
turnover. While substantive, the negative effect of gender quotas on male turnover is only sixth 
in comparison to other tested predictors. This in turn may show that significant part of female 
turnover occurs among women themselves. While positive for descriptive representation this can 
be problematic for the substantive one. 
Electorates and women’s need for a ‘performance premium’ 
When introduced in the model electorates add the second biggest change in R-square in the case 
of both total and male turnover, but they are last when it comes to explaining variance in female 
legislative turnover. In terms of predictors, electoral volatility produces the most substantive 
effects on total and male turnover and only the third most substantive for female turnover. 
Overall, swings in voter party preferences increase the numbers of new male MPs by almost 
three times more in comparison to female newcomers. One interpretation of this could be that in 
the face of changing electoral tides new women candidates are easier to defeat than their male 
counterparts while female incumbents are also more vulnerable. Although this does not 
constitute voter antipathy toward women candidates, it is perhaps evidence of the extra effort, the 
‘performance premium’ as Anzia and Berry (2011) termed it, that women need to put to get 
elected.       
 Electoral systems and incumbency (dis)advantage 
The entry of new women legislators into parliament appears to be more sensitive to electoral 
system attributes in comparison to the entry of men newcomers. As a matter of fact the electoral 
system appears to have no significant effect on male turnover. On the contrary, electoral systems 
appear to be paramount for the entry of women non-incumbents. As hypothesized their effects 
can both advantage and disadvantage women. To begin with, strong personal vote systems 
decrease the influx of new women legislators, but has no effect on men. This we argue could be 
an indication of voter bias. It appears as if in strong personal vote systems men non-incumbents 
are in position to overcome incumbency advantage by benefiting from the higher female 
incumbent vulnerability. On the contrary, women non-incumbents appear to be unable to 
overcome incumbency advantage whether male or female. Contrary to personal vote incentives, 
the size of district magnitude has the opposite effect for women non-incumbents. The bigger its 
size the higher the number of new women entering parliament. This corroborates findings from 
past empirical research according to which higher district magnitude encourages ticket balancing 
strategies that benefit women (Matland and Brown 1992, Matland 1993). Again district 
magnitude appears to have no effect on male turnover. In view of the above, it is evident that the 
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effect of district magnitude on total turnover is primarily a reflection of its effect on female 
turnover.  
 
To conclude, the present study produced new insights on legislative turnover in established 
European democracies. To begin with, it confirmed some findings from earlier work on turnover, 
such as the importance of voter preferences, as well as the role of the institutional context of 
political careers in shaping the supply of aspirants and incumbent mobility in and out of the 
political market. In addition, it took a step at clarifying the causal paths between total turnover 
and certain variables, especially at the party and electoral system levels. Political ideology for 
instance does play a role in political alternation in parliaments, but this is usually obfuscated 
from analyses that focus solely at the aggregate assembly level. District magnitude leads to more 
membership change, because it increases female turnover thanks to parties’ changing electoral 
strategies. They balance their tickets by prioritising more women. Furthermore, the study also 
provided some novel insights on the differences between explanations of female and male 
turnover, which to our knowledge was not shown in a comparative setting before. The influx of 
new male legislators is influenced more by voter party preferences and the institutional context 
of political careers. On the contrary the entry of new women lawmakers in parliament is more 
sensitive on decisions made by political parties and the workings of electoral systems. The 
political market is important, though somewhat differently than in comparison to men, while 
electorates appear to be less important. This in turn confirms past findings in the female 
representation literature. A step in understanding the renewal of female representative elites in 
parliament has been taken. However, the consolidation of women incumbents’ mandate is 
equally crucial as it impacts substantive representation and the ability of female legislators to 
make a difference. Thus, future work on gender turnover could focus on gender differences in 
regards to incumbent failure and/or success rates.  
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